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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PROPOSED UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE FOR
INDIANA: RESTRICTIONS ON NEGOTIABILITY AND
WAIVERS OF DEFENSES IN CONSUMER CREDIT
TRANSACTIONS
Mr. Unwary Buyer decides to purchase a relatively
expensive appliance from the Shoddy Appliance Co. Since he
is unable to pay the entire purchase price in cash, he executes
a conditional sales contract and a promissory note providing
for installment payments of the balance due. Shoddy assures
delivery pending a favorable credit check by the Honest Credit
Co. Shortly after the sale, Honest buys Buyer's promissory
note and takes an assignment of the conditional sales contract
from Shoddy. Buyer receives the appliance from Shoddy, but
soon discovers that it is defective. Shoddy refuses Buyer's
demands to replace or repair the appliance; having already
received payment from Honest, Shoddy has little financial
incentive to meet Buyer's demands. Honest demands that Buyer
continue payments on the promissory note and threatens legal
action in the event of Buyer's default.
The above is illustrative of a dilemma in which a consumer who buys
on credit finds himself if he is the recipient of defective merchandise. The
typical consumer, having no knowledge of the intricacies of negotiable
instruments law, reasonably believes that his contract is with Shoddy and,
therefore, his obligation to pay for the appliance ends with Shoddy's
failure to provide an appliance as warranted. However, if Mr. Unwary
Buyer is in Indiana he would discover to his amazement and misfortune
that he is legally obligated to continue payments to the Honest Credit
Co. in accordance with his promissory note and contract.' While
1. If Buyer refuses to pay, Honest can enforce payment through a lawsuit.
Even if Buyer proves that he has a defense or a claim against Shoddy on the contract,
Honest will normally have minimal difficulty proving that he is a holder in due course
and is therefore entitled to enforce the note free from such claims or defenses. See
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-3-301 through 19-3-305 (Burns Repl. 1964). If Honest bought
the note from Shoddy without "good faith" or with notice of Buyer's claim or defense,
he is not a holder in due course and is subject to Buyer's claim or defense against
Shoddy. However, Indiana has adhered to the traditional rules that "notice" means
actual knowledge and the purchaser of a negotiable note has no duty to inquire into the
underlying transaction unless it has knowledge of suspicious circumstances. IND. ANN.
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Buyer has legal recourse against Shoddy in the form of a breach of
warranty action,2 in most instances the legal fees involved in prosecut-
ing such a lawsuit are prohibitive in relation to his relatively small
claim.'
The credit consumer's dilemma has stimulated a re-examination of
traditional doctrines on the subject of negotiable instruments and waiver
of defense provisions as they relate to consumer credit transactions.
Consequently, in many jurisdictions the result has been judicial deci-
sions and legislative enactments providing consumer protection.
Since an inflexible application of traditional negotiable instruments
law inevitably places an unfair burden on the consumer, courts thirty
years ago began manipulating the doctrines in an effort to protect the
consumer.' In Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,' a finance company
brought a replevin action against an automobile buyer who had executed
a promissory note and conditional sales contract, which the finance
company now held. The buyer alleged that the car was of little or no
value and, attempting to impugn the plaintiff's good faith, further alleged
that the finance company had provided the automobile dealer with an
instrument containing both a conditional sales contract and a promissory
note, and that the finance company had purchased the note and an
assignment of the contract from the dealer on the day of the buyer's
STAT. §§ 19-3-302, -304, Indiana Comments (Burns Repl. 1964); Woodsmall v.
Myers, 87 Ind. App. 69, 158 N.E. 646 (1927); Greencastle Production Credit
Association v. Riddell National Bank, 137 Ind. App. 686, 210 N.E.2d 872 (196 ). Even
in the event Honest is unable to establish holder in due course status, he will probably be
able to enforce payment. Buyer's contract with Shoddy normally contains a clause in
which he acknowledges that the contract will be assigned and waives, as against any as-
signee of the contract, any claims or defenses which he may have against Shoddy. Such
a waiver of defenses is enforceable in Indiana. IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-9-206 (Burns Repl.
1964) clearly makes such waivers enforceable and, although the section makes its authori-
zation of such waiver clauses "subject to any statute or decision which establishes a
different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods," an Indiana Comment indicates
that "there is no policy in Indiana law which would apply a different rule in favor of
consumers." Id. Indiana Comment (Burns Repl. 1964).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-2-714 (Burns Repl. 1964).
3. In the event Buyer can afford to bring a lawsuit and his claim is sizable
enough to make a suit worthwhile, there is always the additional problem that Shoddy
may be insolvent or will have left the jurisdiction, in which case Buyer's claim is
rendered worthless.
4. In an article tracing the development of the commercial law doctrine of
negotiability, Grant Gilmore pointed to and endorsed a then embryonic body of case law
subjecting what should have been a "holder in due course" to consumer contract
defenses and rendering waivers of defenses invalid. The author also notes some early
legislation protecting consumers in this situation and warns that the distinction between
"commercial" and "non-commercial" [consumer] transactions ought to be observed.
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ. 1057, 1097-
1102 (1954).
5. 199 AR. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Childs].
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signing. The Arkansas Supreme Court, refusing to reverse a jury finding
for the buyer, stated that the finance company was:
S.. so closely connected with the entire transaction . . . that it
cannot be heard to say that it, in good faith, was an innocent
purchaser of the instrument for value before maturity ....
Rather than being a purchaser of the instrument after its execu-
tion it was . . . a party to the agreement and instrument from
the beginning.'
Although Childs involved a transaction in which consumer goods
were involved, the court said nothing which would indicate a different
policy were it a case involving a transaction between businessmen (a
"(commercial transaction") where there was a "close connection" between
the seller and financer. It is not clear whether the court's decision was
based upon the theory that the "close connection" impugned the finance
company's good faith, thus preventing it from becoming a holder in due
course, or that there was no negotiation of the note because the "close
connection" made the seller a mere agent of the finance company. In
spite of the Arkansas court's failure to clearly articulate its rationale,
Childs has become a landmark in the area of consumer protection.7
A different approach, reaching the same result, was taken in State
National Bank of El Paso v. Cantrell.8 The court held that a finance
company suing to enforce payments on a promissory note, although a
holder in due course, was subject to defenses and claims on the conditional
sales contract which had been assigned to it. The court reasoned that
since the note and contract were both executed and transferred simul-
taneously, the note became burdened with the contract obligations.
Although this theory had an advantage by virtue of its ease of applica-
tion, it never enjoyed the popularity of the Childs "close connection"
rationale.9
6. Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
7. Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable
Notes and Wai'ver-of-Defense Clauses in Consiuner Sales, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 667, 676
(1968).
8. 47 N.M. 389, 143 P.2d 592 (1943).
9. Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1953), rejected
Cantrell in holding that the concurrent execution of a promissory note and a conditional
sales contract did not impair the negotiability of the note. However, the court followed
Childs in holding that the buyer could interpose a defense of failure of consideration
against the finance company suing on a promissory note, where the note and conditional
sales contract were executed together, the finance company had investigated the buyer's
credit, furnished the note and agreement, and approved the terms of the note and agree-
ment, since the "close connection" barred the finance company from holder in due course
status. See also Commercial Credit Co. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal.2d 766,
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An important difference between the approach of the early and the
modern cases is that today an express distinction is made between "con-
sumer transactions" and "commercial transactions." Unico v. Owenw'
is illustrative of the modern approach. Unico involved a suit by a finance
company to enforce payment on a promissory note and contract executed
by the defendant in connection with a sale of stereophonic records.1 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, after discussing decisions in other jurisdic-
tions and policies favoring consumer protection, held that as to consumer
goods transactions the finance company is not a holder in due course
if it sets or approves the dealer's standards for the underlying transaction,
and agrees to take a given quantity of the dealer's negotiable paper.12
Of further import is the court's treatment of a waiver provision
contained in the contract. The defendant, in addition to giving a promis-
sory note, also signed a conditional sales contract containing a clause
whereby he waived, as against any assignee of the contract, any claim or
defense which he might have against the seller."2 Unico, assignee of the
214 P.2d 819 (1950); Local Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade, 361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962;) ;
First & Lumberman's National Bank of Chippewa Falls v. Bucholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18
N.W.2d 771 (1945). For extensive annotation and discussion see generally 44 A.L.R.2d
8 (1955) ; Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958
WASH. U.L.Q. 177; Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure
of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 48, 65-74 (1960).
The finance industry rapidly developed a device to counteract the ruling in
Cantrell. They simply inserted a clause in the conditional sales contract whereby the
buyer acknowledges that the contract will be assigned and waives, as against assignees,
all defenses and claims which he might have against the seller. The conditional sales
contract was thus made "negotiable." Gilmore, supra note 4, at 1094-95. After the
passage in many states of the Uniform Commercial Code, courts were all but precluded
from following Cantrell. Section 9-206 of the UCC provides that a buyer who signs both a
negotiable instrument and a security agreement as a part of the same transaction is
deemed to have waived all defenses, as against the assignee, which he might have
against the seller-the precise opposite of the effect which Cantrell attached to such a
concurrent signing. See Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-206 [IIND. AxN. STAT. §
19-9-206 (Burns Repl. 1964)].
10. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Unico].
11. It was undisputed that the defendant buyer had not received the promised
consideration from his seller, and that his seller was now insolvent; therefore, the court
was forced to choose between two innocent parties, the buyer and the financer, as to
who ought to bear the loss occasioned by the seller. Id.
12. The court phrased its holding as follows:
For purposes of consumer goods transactions, we hold that where the
seller's performance is executory in character and when it appears from the
totality of the arrangements between dealer and financer that the financer has
had a substantial voice in setting standards for the underlying transaction, or
has approved the standards established by the dealer, and has agreed to take
all or a predetermined or substantial, quantity of the negotiable paper which is
backed by such standards, the financer should be considered a participant in
the original transaction and therefore not entitled to holder in due course status.
Id. at 122-23, 232 A.2d at 417.
13. See notes 1 and 9, supra.
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contract as well as holder of the promissory note, argued that the con-
tract, independent of the promissory note, was enforceable free of Owen's
defenses. The court rejected this contention, ruling that the waiver of
defense clause was void as against public policy.' Unico is "illustrative
of a developing judicial attitude" toward protection of the consumer at
the expense of financers of consumer credit."5
State legislatures have also modified traditional negotiability doc-
trine in an effort to protect reasonable consumer expectations. By the
time Unico was decided in 1967, many states had restricted the negoti-
ability of notes given in consumer credit transactions.' 6 Numerous states
had taken the further step of prohibiting the use or limiting the effect of
waiver of defense clauses in various types of consumer credit trans-
actions.'
14. The New Jersey Supreme Court gave three reasons for finding the waiver
of defense clause void:
(1) [I]t is opposed to the policy of the Negotiable Instruments Law which
had established the controlling prerequisities for negotiability, and provided
also that the rights of one not a holder in due course were subject to all legal
defenses which the maker of the instrument had against the transferor. (2)
[I]t is opposed to the spirit of N.J.S. 2A: -25-1, N.J.S.A., which provides
that an obligor sued by an assignee "shall be allowed . . . all . . . defenses
he had against the assignor or his representatives before notice of such assign-
ment was given to him"; and (3) the policy of our state is to protect condi-
tional vendees against imposition by conditional vendors and installment sellers.
50 N.J. at 124, 232 A.2d at 417-18.
Other jurisdictions had preceded New Jersey in holding such waiver of defense
clauses invalid. See, e.g., Dearborn Motors Credit Corporation v. Neel, 184 Kan. 437,
337 P.2d 992 (1959) ; Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d
385 (1958) ; American National Bank v. A. G. Somerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216
P. 376 (1923). See generally 44 A.L.R. 2d 8, 92-96, 162-72 (1955).
15. Murphy, supra note 7, at 675. See also American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16
Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886, 889 (1968):
In our opinion, the doctrine so well stated in Unico strikes the proper balance
between the protection of the commercial need for negotiability and the indi-
vidual's need for relief against fraud. As that court stated, we are impelled to
"join those courts which deny holder in due course status in consumer goods
sales cases to those financers whose involvement with the seller's business is as
close, and whose knowledge of the extrinsic factors-i.e., the terms of the under-
lying sale agreement-is as pervasive, as it is in the present case."
16. See, e.g. Cal. Retail Installment Sales Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1803.2 (a),
1810.9 (West Supp. 1967); Conn. Home Solicitation Sales Act, Pus. AcT 749 (West
Conn. Leg. Ser. 1063 (1967); Ill. Consumer Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121
2, § 262 D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). For exhaustive listing, see Murphy, supra note
7, at 674, n. 22.
As early as 1951, the Maryland legislature enacted a statute providing that the
holder of a note given in a retail installment transaction is subject to all defenses which
-the buyer might have asserted against the seller or payee. Maryland Retail Installment
Sales Act, MD. CODE ANN., art. 83, § 134 (Flack 1951).
17. See, e.g., Cal. Retail Installment Sales Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1804.1-2
(West Supp. 1967); Ill. Consumer Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262
D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Mich. Retail Installment Sales Act, MicH. Coup.
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In addition to courts and legislatures, the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code saw a need for consumer protection and thus included
the following provision in its 1952 version of the Uniform Commercial
Code:
An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as a part of
a contract for sale that he will not assert against an assignee
any claim or defense arising out of the sale is not enforceable
by any person. If such a buyer as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
even a holder in due course of the negotiable instrument is
subject to such claims or defenses if he seeks to enforce the
security agreement by attaching or levying upon the goods in
an action upon the instrument.'"
However, the bitter opposition of the banking lobby" resulted in the
adoption of the existing provision which expressly authorizes waiver of
defense clauses in commercial transactions, while attempting to defer to
prior state law as to consumer goods."
In spite of the trend toward consumer protection, Indiana continues
LAWS §§ 445.864, -5 (1967). For exhaustive listing see, Murphy, supra note 7 at
674, n. 24.
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 9-206(1)
(1952 version). The UCC, with the inclusion of the above provision was adopted in
Pennsylvania. Act. No. 1 of the 140th General Assembly, Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, approved April 6, 1953, effective July 1, 1954. PENN. STAT. ANN. 12A § 9-206
(Purdon's 1954).
Counsel for several Pennsylvania banks observes that UCC § 9-206(1) did not
fulfill the dire predictions of some financers. Felix, Experience With Dealer and
Consumer Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 BANKING L.J. 229,
233 (1956).
19. Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination
of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969); Kripke,
Consumner Credit Regdation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLum. L. Rav. 445,
470 (1968).
20. UCC § 9-206(1) now reads:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee
that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may
have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense,
except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable Miistrument under the Article on Commercial Paper(Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable
instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
By authorizing waiver clauses in commercial contracts, although deferring to prior
state law as to consumer contracts, the UCC inadvertently lent support to the view
that such waiver clauses are authorized in consumer transactions in those states, such
as Indiana, which haven't distinguished commercial from consumer transactions. See
note 1 supra.
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to adhere to traditional doctrines and refuses to draw a distinction
between commercial and consumer transactions.2' Indiana courts early
rejected the argument that a "close connection" between the dealer and
financer warranted a finding that the financer could not be a holder in
due course.22 Furthermore, Indiana has neither judicially nor legislatively
invalidated or limited the effect of waiver of defense clauses in consumer
credit transactions.23 In light of recent developments, however, the
Indiana General Assembly will have an opportunity to re-evaluate this
position. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,24 a comprehensive piece
of consumer protection legislation, was introduced in the 1969 General
Assembly. Because of its breadth and complexity, a joint resolution was
passed creating a legislative study committee to examine the UCCC and
make recommendations to the 1971 General Assembly.2" That committee
has completed its work and has recommended passage of an amended
version of the UCCC.
The UCCC contains two important and controversial sections which
attempt to penetrate the insulation presently enjoyed by holders in due
course of consumer notes and assignees of consumer contract obliga-
tions. Section 2.403, if passed as recommended, would prohibit the
seller in a consumer credit sale or lease from taking a negotiable instru-
ment, other than a check, as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or
lessee. It further provides that a holder of a negotiable instrument is not
a holder in due course if he had notice that the instrument was issued
in a consumer transaction.2" Section 2.404, if enacted, would protect the
21. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-3-301 through 19-3-307, Comments, Decisions Under
Prior Law (Burns Repl. 1964) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-9-206, Indiana Comment
(Burns Repl. 1964) ; See also note 1 supra.
22. In a suit by a financer on a promissory note given by the defendant for the
balance due on a conditional sales contract for an oil burner, the defendant alleged
that the plaintiff financer was in the habit of buying and discounting notes taken by the
sales company for such burners, that the plaintiff had knowledge of all the conditions
of the underlying contract, and that the promissory note contained a recital that it
covered installments due under a conditional sales contract for an oil burner. The court
sustained plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's answer and granted summary judgment for
the plaintiff. Berry v. Brandt C. Downey Co., 89 Ind. App. 545, 167 N.E. 136 (1929).
See also Dorbecker v. Brandt C. Downey Co., 88 Ind. App. 557, 163 N.E. 535
(1928) ; Congress Financial Corp. v. J-K Coin-Op Equip. Co., 353 F.2d 683 (7th Cir.
1965).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-9-206, Indiana Comment (Burns Repl. 1964); See also
note 1 supra.
24. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Official Text of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1969 Revised Final Draft [hereinafter cited
as UCCC].
25. For a brief report from the chairman of the Indiana UCCC Study Committee,
see Rubin, Proposed Indiana Uniform Consiomer Credit Code, REs GESTAE, September,
1970, at 6.
26. UCCC, § 2.403:
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consumer from the impact of signing a sales contract in which he waives
his claims and defenses as to assignees. Since this section is quite con-
troversial, two alternatives have been proposed.17 Alternative A un-
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease, primarily
for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable
instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or
lessee. A holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with
notice that it is issued in violation of this section. A holder in due course is not
subject to the liabilities set forth in the provisions on the effect of violations on
rights of parties (Section 5.202) and the provisions on civil actions by
Administrator (Section 6.113).
27. UCCC, § 2.404:
Alternative A: With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer
lease, other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose,
an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor is subject to all claims and
defenses of the buyer or lessee against the seller or lessor arising out of the
sale or lease notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's
liability under this section may not exceed the amount owing to the assignee
at the time the claim or defense is asserted against the assignee. Rights of the
buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted as a matter of defense
to or set-off against a claim by the assignee.
Alternative B: (1) With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease,
other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, an agreement
by the buyer or lessee not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense
arising out of the sale or lease is enforceable only by an assignee not related
to the seller or lessor who acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract in good
faith and for value, who gives the buyer or lessee notice of the assignment as
provided in this section and who, within 3 months after the mailing of the
notice of the assignment, receives no written notice of the facts giving rise to
the buyer's or lessee's claim or defense. This agreement is enforceable only with
respect to claims or defenses which have arisen before the end of the 3-month
period after the notice was mailed. The notice of assignment shall be in writing
and addressed to the buyer or lessee at his address as stated in the contract,
identify the contract, describe the goods or services, state the names of the seller
or lessor and buyer or lessee and the number, amounts and due dates of the
installments, and contain a conspicuous notice to the buyer or lessee that he
has 3 months wvithin which to notify the assignee in writing of any complaints,
claims or defenses he may have against the seller or lessor and that if written
notification of the complaints, claims or defenses is not received by the
assignee within the 3-month period, the assignee will have the right to enforce
the contract free of any claims or defenses the buyer or lessee may have against
the seller or lessor which have arisen before the end of the 3-month period after
notice was mailed.
(2) An assignee does not acquire a buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith
within the meaning of subsection (1) if the assignee has knowledge or, from
his course of dealing with the seller or lessor or his records, notice of sub-
stantial complaints by other buyers or lessees of the seller's or lessor's failure
or refusal to perform his contracts with them and of the seller's or lessor's
failure to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time after the assignee
notifies him of the complaints.
(3) To the extent that under this section an assignee is subject to claims or
defenses of the buyer or lessee against the seller or lessor, the assignee's
liability under this section may not exceed the amount owing to the assignee at
the time the claim or defense is asserted against the assignee and rights of the
buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted as a matter of defense
or set-off against a claim by the assignee.
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conditionally invalidates waiver of defense clauses in consumer credit
contracts.28 The Indiana study committee has chosen Alternative B,
generally considered the weaker in terms of consumer protection, which
would make a waiver of defense clause unenforceable unless (1) an
unrelated assignee acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith,
and (2) the assignee gives notice to the buyer or lessee of the assign-
ment, and (3) the buyer or lessee fails to notify the assignee within
three months of any claim or defense which he has against the seller
or lessor. If the buyer's or lessee's claim or defense against the seller
arises more than three months after notice from the assignee, the buyer
is not obligated to notify the assignee.29
The adoption by the 1971 Indiana General Assembly of sections
2.403 and 2.404 of the UCCC would mean a reversal in the policy and
law of Indiana related to holders in due course and waivers of defenses
in connection with consumer transactions. Such a reversal warrants a
study of its policies and possible effects, and of the problems and criticisms
28. Id. Alternative A.
29. Id. Alternative B. The Indiana legislative study committee has also recom-
mended shortening the specified notice period from 3 months to 45 days:
... the Committee noted that sellers would be forced to maintain high cash
reserves with their financial institutions to protect assignees from losses if
assignees were made subject to the defenses of the buyer. Balanced against
the burden of maintaining reserves was the theory that assignees should review
the practices of their client sellers with more care. The Committee determined
that the liabifity of assignees should be limited and the period of 45 days was
chosen inasmuch as the existing practice is to allow 45 days between the
consummation of a credit sale and the first installment payment.
Interim Committee Report of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Study Committee, 6.
Given that the committee has chosen Alternative B to § 2.404, it is*possible that
the amendment changing the notice period to 45 days will indirectly benefit consumers.
Alternative B provides that waiver of defense agreements are "enforceable only with
respect to claims or defenses which have arisen before the end of the 3-month (45 day)
period after the notice was mailed." UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B. Thus if a breach of
warranty arises after the end of the notice period, the claim is available (i.e., the
agreement is not enforceable) to the consumer even if he never notifies the assignee.
By shortening the notice period, claims which would formerly have arisen within the
period during which notice is required to preserve the claim or defense (e.g., on the
50th day) will now fall outside the notice period and be available to the consumer
without the burden of giving notice.
One commentator has pointed out that Alternative B could be interpreted to cut
off warranty claims as to latent defects by deeming them to have arisen "when tender
of delivery is made." See UCC, § 2-725. However, he adds, there is no reason for
courts to reach to the UCC in order to "disembowel" the intent of § 2.404. Hogan,
Integrating the UCCC and the UCC-Linitations on Creditors' Agreements and
Practices, 33 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 686, 689 (1969). To prevent such a
castration of § 2.404, it is surely advisable that the UCCC should include a definition
of "when a claim arises" for the purposes of that section, where latent defects giving
rise to warranty claims are concerned. Such a definition could be phrased in terms of the
consumer's actual knowledge of the existence of a defect, or reason to know that such
a defect exists.
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of the two sections intended to bring it about.
The doctrine of negotiability"0 holds that one who purchases com-
mercial paper meeting the requirements of a negotiable instrument,8
in good faith and for value, without notice of any defect in the instru-
ment or title,8" is accorded certain procedural advantages 8 in suing
thereon and the substantive advantage of holding the paper free and clear
of claims or defenses arising out of the underlying transaction3 The
premise upon which the doctrine rests is that it encourages a free flow of
commercial paper by alleviating prospective buyers' concerns about the
possibility of time consuming and expensive litigation involving the
underlying contract. With prospective buyers' fears thus alleviated, com-
mercial paper becomes a highly liquid asset readily transferable in a
commercial transaction. By facilitating commercial transactions, the
doctrine of negotiability encourages a free flow of commerce which in
turn stimulates economic growth. Since economic growth is a desirable
end, the conclusion that the doctrine of negotiability should be encouraged
follows inevitably." Similarly, if parties to a contract are free to insert a
clause whereby one party waives claims and defenses against the other
party's assignee, thus making a non-negotiable instrument "negotiable,"
the free flow of commerce will be further encouraged. The waiver of
defense clause finds additional support in the doctrine of freedom of
contract, which is firmly rooted as one tenet of our society's belief in
freedom of thought and action.8
The doctrine of negotiability and arguments supporting it are so
widely accepted and firmly entrenched that most advocates of consumer
protection have chosen not to attack it frontally." Instead, they bypass
30. The doctrine of negotiability was established relatively early in the law of
commercial paper and parallels the doctrine of good faith in the law of sales. Lawson
v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (1801); Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E
870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836). For a discussion of the early cases see Littlefield,
supra note 9, at 50-52; Gilmore, supra note 4.
31. UCC § 3-104 [IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-3-104 (Burns Repl. 1964)1.
32. UCC §§ 3-302, 3-303, 3-304 [I n. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-3-302, 3-303, 3-304
(Burns Repl. 1964)]. There has been a split in the jurisdictions within the United
States over whether the test of good faith to establish holder in due course status is an
objective or subjective test, with the majority by far applying the so-called subjective
test. Under the subjective test the purchaser of a negotiable note is in good faith
unless he has some actual knowledge of a claim or defense or defect in the instrument.
The objective test uses some form of "reason to know" or "duty to make reasonable
inquiry" as a part of the test of good faith. See Littlefield, supra note 9.
33. UCC § 3-307 [IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-3-307 (Burns Repl. 1964)1.
34. UCC § 3-305 [IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-3-305 (Burns Repl. 1964)1; Littlefield,
supra note 9, at 49, 50.
35. Murphy, supra note 7, at 668.
36. Id.
37. An exception is Homer Kripke, an avowed advocate of creditor interests who
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the entire line of argument by conceding its applicability to commercial
transactions while contending that conflicting and overriding policies are
involved in consumer credit transactions.3" The doctrine of negotiabiilty
contemplates that commercial paper will be circulated freely. Since most
consumer notes are transferred only once, from the dealer to the finance
company, the policy behind negotiability does not really support its
application to consumer credit transactions."s Furthermore, commercial
law doctrines contemplate parties dealing at arms length with relatively
equal bargaining power. This relationship does not exist in the typical
consumer credit transaction in which a form contract is imposed upon
the consumer whose bargaining power is minimal. It has even been said
that the normal consumer credit contract is so one-sided as to be an
"adhesion contract. 40
Aside from the above distinctions between consumer and commercial
transactions, there are sound policies against the application of the
negotiability doctrine in the consumer credit area. The consumer is under
considerable financial burden if he must continue payments to the finance
company while attempting to legally "encourage" the dealer to comply
with the contract. Other than customer good will, the dealer has no
incentive to fulfill his contract obligations, since he has already received
payment from the finance company. The consumer may be able to enforce
compliance through a lawsuit, but only if he can afford to pay an
attorney in addition to the finance company.41 However, if the finance
company were subject to the defenses which the consumer has against
the dealer, its ability to collect from the buyer would be conditioned upon
formerly argued against subjecting holders in due course to consumer defenses. He
recently repudiated his former position and now is in favor of preserving the defenses
of commercial as well as consumer buyers in suits by a holder or an assignee. Kripke,
supra note 19, at 472-73.
38. Grant Gilmore was one of the first to draw a distinction between commercial
and consumer ("non-commercial") transactions. Gilmore, supra note 4, at 1101-02.
See also Jordan and Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
387, 436 (1968).
39. Jones, supra note 9, at 183-85.
40. Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts 1I, 35 TEMP. L.Q.
281 (1962) ; Kripke, szpra note 19, at 472.
An "adhesion contract" is a standardized agreement drafted unilaterally by a
dominant party (resolving all questions in favor of the dominant party, unless con-
trary to law), and then offered to a weaker party as the only acceptable instrument.
Since the "contract" is the same wherever the weaker party (here the credit consumer)
goes, his only choice is whether or not to accept or reject the entire transaction.
Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts I, 35 TEAIP. L.Q. 125, 128-30 (1962).
41. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. These burdens upon the consumer,
which he suffers even if the dealer is solvent and available, have been called the "inertia
of litigation" and the "strain of current cash outlay." Littlefield, Preserving Consumer
Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272, 284 (1969).
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the dealer's performance of his contract obligations. Thus the finance
company, with the bargaining power and resources necessary to coerce
the dealer into compliance with his contract, would have an incentive to
apply such coercion. 2 Since the finance company may ultimately find it
necessary to seek restitution from the dealer, it will also have an incentive
to protect itself by not financing insolvent or fraudulent dealers, thus
reducing their number. Finally, in the situation in which the dealer is
insolvent or has disappeared, the court must decide which of two innocent
parties ought to bear the loss occasioned by the dealer. Where both
parties are solvent ongoing businesses, as in the commercial situation,
the negotiability doctrine does not conflict with a policy of choosing the
better loss bearer, since either party is capable of absorbing and spreading
the loss. Where the two innocent parties are a finance company and an
individual consumer, the doctrine of negotiability runs headlong into the
policy of loss spreading since it causes financial hardship by placing the
burden on the consumer. 3
These arguments in favor of eliminating negotiability in consumer
transactions take on their greatest appeal where the relationship between
the finance company and the dealer is a close one. In fact most courts,
in eliminating negotiability in consumer transactions, limited their
holdings to cases in which there was a close relationship.44 The UCCC
has incorporated some of the elements of the courts' "close connection"
limitation into sections 2.403 and 2.404. For example, section 2.403
prohibits the taking by a dealer of a negotiable instrument in a consumer
credit transaction, but permits a subsequent taker to attain holder in
due course status if he did not have notice that the note was issued in a
consumer transaction. The Comment explains that "it is possible that in
rare cases second or third takers may not know of an instrument's
consumer origin; in this unusual situation the policy favoring negoti-
ability is upheld in order not to cast a cloud over negotiable instruments
generally."' 5 Thus, although section 2.403 does not expressly incorporate
the "close connection" test, the financer retains the opportunity to prove
42. See McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 387, 401-02 (1967) ; Kripke, supra note 19, at 472.
43. See Littlefield, supra note 41, at 283-85.
44. See, e.g., Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1953);
Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16
Ohio App. 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). However, the statutes in many states prohibiting
the use of negotiable instruments in retail installment sales do not require any close rela-
tionship between financer and dealer. Such a statute more fully implements a policy of
spreading losses caused by insolvent and fraudulent dealers, rather than limiting itself to
a policy of forcing financers to police such dealers. Littlefield, supra note 41, at 283-84.
45. UCCC § 2.403, Comment.
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that he was "sufficiently removed" from the dealer so as not to have
notice of the consumer origin of the instrument.
Section 2.404, Alternative B, allows enforcement of a waiver of
defense clause "only by an assignee not related to the seller or lessor."4
In addition, the assignee must acquire the buyer's or lessee's contract in
"good faith. '47 A negative definition of good faith incorporating elements
of the "close connection" test, is given in section 2.404, Alternative
B (2) :
An assignee does not acquire a buyer's or lessee's contract
in good faith within the meaning of subsection (1) if the
assignee has knowledge or, from his course of dealing with the
seller or lessor or his records, notice of substantial complaints
by other buyers or lessees of the seller's or lessor's failure or
refusal to perform his contracts with them and of the seller's
or lessor's failure to remedy his defaults within a reasonable
ments of section 2.404, Alternative B (1) .
These provisions make a waiver of defense clause absolutely unenforce-
able if the assignee has a close relationship with the dealer. In the absence
of a close relationship, an assignee of a consumer credit contract can
enforce a waiver of defense clause by following the notice require-
ments of Section 2.404, Alternative B (1)."'
Thus, the results which UCCC sections 2.403 and 2.404 are intended
to achieve are readily apparent: shift the initial burdens of seller fraud,
breach of contract and insolvency onto the financers in order to encourage
them to screen and police dealers who do not perform their contracts.
In spite of the long history of court decisions and legislation intended
to achieve similar results, little has been written about the effects of such
legislation.5" The most comprehensive attempt to study the effects of the
elimination of negotiability was undertaken by the Yale Law Journal."
In order to determine the impact of an act of the 1967 Connecticut
legislature providing that "the obligation to pay arising from a home
46. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B. Text at note 27 supra.
47. 1d.
48. Id.
49. See notes 27 and 29, supra and accompanying text.
50. Questionnaires were sent to financial institutions in the Springfield, Massachu-
setts area. Less than 50 per cent responded. 55.5 per cent said the change in the law had
no effect; 44.4 per cent said it had caused a shift toward direct loans; 22.2 per cent said
it caused an increase in time spent on consumer credit investigations. Comment, Con-
suiner Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WISCONSIN
L. REv. 505, 525, note 98. See also Felix, supra note 18; McEwen, supra note 42, at 402.
51. Note, A Case Study of the Izpact of Conswiner Legislation: The Elimination
of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE LJ. 618 (1969).
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solicitation sale cannot be evidenced by a negotiable instrument," 52 Yale
used questionnaires and interviews to discover the effects upon and
reactions of banks, finance companies, and dealers. The report concluded
that the act had caused banks to impose new restrictions which should
reduce the extent of dealer fraud, but that "overreaction" by most banks
had the effect of raising the cost of credit and making it difficult for
small, legitimate businessmen to market their consumer paper. However,
the report continued, further experience with non-negotiable consumer
notes should result in a more rational calculation of risk by the financers,
and in any event, the relief to the consumer in the form of loss spreading
is worth the slight increases in the costs imposed on dealers and con-
sumers.5
Since the experience with elimination or restriction of negotiability
in consumer credit transactions has not been one of drastic upheaval, but
rather of minor drawbacks accompanied by considerable relief for con-
sumers, arguments on both sides have shifted from principle to extent
and method. Consequently, because of a desire on the part of the drafters
that the UCCC be widely promulgated, sections 2.403 and 2.404 have
become a focal point of the controversy. Obviously a section drafted to
reflect a compromise between consumer and financial interests in Indiana
would not satisfy consumers in a state which already has a strong con-
sumer protection law. Predictably, neither consumer protection advocates
nor financial interests are satisfied with the final draft of the UCCC"4
although the consumer advocates are more vocal in their criticism of
sections 2.403 and 2.404.
One of the chief criticisms directed toward section 2.403 is that
it fails to abolish the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit
transactions. 5 Since section 2.403 merely prohibits the taking of a
negotiable instrument by a seller in a consumer credit transaction, but
upholds the holder in due course doctrine where a seller takes and
negotiates a prohibited instrument to an innocent purchaser, it is argued
that the UCCC does not adequately protect the consumer." A Comment
52. Id. at 619. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1968) (P.A. 749).
53. See note 51, supra at 655-66.
54. One commentator has suggested that the fact that no single interest group is
completely satisfied with the UCCC may be its strongest endorsement. Moo, Con-
sunerismn and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw. 957 (1970).
55. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT: A MODEL ACT FOR CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION § 2.405(2) (First Final Draft, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONSUMER
AcTr]:
Any holder of an instrument, contract or other writing evidencing an obligation
of the consumer takes it subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer
up to and including the amount of the transaction total arising out of the
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of the drafters counters by pointing out that in order to attain holder in
due course status, a purchaser of a negotiable instrument must prove a
lack of notice that the instrument was issued in violation of the section.
Since the prohibition of section 2.403 will be well-known in the financial
community, and since financers know which dealers sell consumer goods,
a financer will normally not qualify as a holder in due course." It may
be, as the drafters suggest, that to subject a holder without notice to
consumer defenses would "cast a cloud over negotiable instruments
generally.""8 However, if it really would be such a "rare case" as the
drafters indicate, it is difficult to see how it would create a general fear
among financers. Furthermore, since it would be a "rare case," why not
place the burden of the loss on the financer, who can absorb and spread
it readily rather than on the consumer to whom it may mean financial
disaster."
Another criticism of section 2.403 is based upon a belief that dealers
and financial institutions will simply evade it by changing the form of
their transactions to make them appear as loans." For example, instead
of executing a promissory note and a conditional sales contract as part of
the transaction with the dealer, the consumer may be referred by the
the dealer to a particular financer pursuant to a prior agreement between
the dealer and financer. The buyer would then receive a "direct loan"
from the financer with which to make his purchase. Preliminary but
inconclusive studies have shown an increase in "direct loans" as a result
of the elimination of negotiability of consumer credit paper.61 It has been
proposed to amend the UCCC in order to prevent this evasive technique
by preserving consumer defenses against the "closely related" lender. 2
transaction whether or not it is payable "to order or to bearer."
A comment to the above section criticizes the UCCC for pretending to prohibit the
use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit sales while still recognizing that
there may be holders in due course.
57. UCCC § 2.403, Comment.
58. Id.
59. See Littlefield, supra note 41, at 283-85.
60. Littlefield, supra note 41, at 292; NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 2.407, Comment.
61. See note 50 supra; Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legisla-
tion: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J.
618, 642, 645 (1969).
62. Littlefield, supra note 41, at 293. Littlefield's proposal is as follows:
(1) Where a lender makes a consumer loan in close connection [subsection
(2) of this section] with a sale or lease of goods, services or an interest
in land purchased primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose,
such lender is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee
against the seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease notwithstanding an
agreement to the contrary, but the lender's liability may not exceed the
amount owing to the lender at the time the claim or defense is asserted against
the lender.
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The difficulty with such a proposal is in establishing criteria to
determine what constitutes a "close relationship" between dealer and
lender since the pattern of such a relationship is yet to evolve. If the
criteria adopted are over-inclusive, legitimate lenders may be affected,
and sound reasons exist for not subjecting them to the same treatment
as financers of consumer credit sales. In the typical loan transaction, the
consumer obtains his loan independent of his transaction with the seller.
Therefore, he has no reason to believe that his obligation to the lender
is subject to the dealer's compliance with the sales contract. A lender who
has neither a continuing relationship with nor an opportunity to select his
borrower's dealer, ought not be burdened with the costs of dealer breach
or fraud. It is arguable that a lender could insure the compliance of even
an independent dealer more readily than could a consumer. However, in
the context of a direct loan transaction the lender has no recourse or claim
(2) A lender makes a loan in close connection with a sale or lease where:
(a) The lender is a person related to the seller; or
(b) The lender chose to make the loan directly to the buyer in preference
to becoming an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor for the purpose of
denying the buyer or lessee the protection of Section 2.403 or 2.404; or
(c) The lender made the loan, and a seller or lessor made a sale or
lease, under circumstances where the lender knew of the purpose of the loan
he was making, the seller or lessor had caused the buyer or lessee to transact
the loan with the lender, and the lender made the proceeds of the loan,
directly or indirectly, payable or endorsable over to the seller or lessor,
whether or not the lender takes a security interest in the subject matter of
the sale or lease; or
(d) The lender, within ten days after the sale is made, takes a security
interest in the consumer goods which are the subject matter of the sale or lease.
See also, NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 2.407.
(1) The creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all of
the claims and defenses of the consumer up to the total amount financed,
arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of the loan
are used, if the creditor participated in or was connected with the consumer
sale or lease transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), the creditor participates in
or is connected with a consumer sale or lease transaction when:
(a) the creditor is a person related to the seller or lessor; or
(b) the seller or lessor prepares documents used in cdnnection with
the loan; or
(c) the creditor supplies forms to the seller or lessor used by the con-
sumer in obtaining the loan; or
(d) the creditor makes 20 or more loans in any calendar year, the
proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller or lessor, or
with a person related to the same seller or lessor; or
(e) the consumer is referred to the creditor by the seller or lessor; or
(f) the creditor, directly or indirectly, pays the seller or lessor any
consideration whether or not it is in connection with the particular transaction;
or
(g) the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the
consumer in the consumer sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement between
the issuer and the seller or lessor.
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of its own against the dealer to use as leverage.
Attempting to draft legislation to deal with a non-existent problem
is a highly speculative operation, and probably ought not be undertaken.
If financers do in fact resort to a sham loan transaction so as to defeat the
purpose of section 2.403, the courts can effectuate the policy of the UCCC
by recognizing and treating the sham as a credit transaction within the
scope of section 2.403. Once the material characteristics of an evasive loan
transaction come to light, more meaningful legislation can be drafted."3
Elimination or restriction of the negotiability of consumer notes
through section 2.403 would be of minimal benefit to the consumer in the
absence of similar restrictions on waiver of defense clauses. If waiver of
defense clauses are left untouched, dealers and finance companies could
make consumer contract obligations "negotiable" without the use of a
negotiable instrument prohibited by section 2.403.6" For this reason
section 2.404 is a necessary adjunct to section 2.403.
Section 2.404 was originally drafted to subject an assignee of the
rights of a seller or lessor to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee,
notwithstanding the existence of a waiver of defense agreement."5 In
conjunction with section 2.403 it thus embodied a strong policy of
preserving consumer defenses, shifting the burdens of dealer breach,
fraud, and insolvency onto the finance company. However, it was argued
that such an inflexible policy would result in financers refusing to
finance small, undercapitalized businessmen and would therefore be harm-
ful, if not destructive, to small business.66 In response, Alternative B
was added as a compromise.6" This section also preserves consumer de-
fenses against an assignee in spite of a contrary waiver agreement, but
only if the consumer gives notice to assignee of claims or defenses which
he has against the dealer within three months of receiving notice of the
assignment. The notice requirement operates only as to claims or defenses
which arise within three months; the waiver of defense agreement is
absolutely unenforceable as to claims or defenses which arise after the
three month period."8
One criticism of Alternative B is that it is well-suited to the middle-
class consumer, but fails to aid the poor consumer most in need of
63. See, Robertson, Consumer Protections Under the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 41 Miss. L.J. 36, 58 (1969).
64. See notes 1 and 9 supra.
65. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative A. Text at note 27 supra.
66. Moo, supra note 54, at 967. This view is lent a modicum of support by the
Yale study of the impact of the elimination of negotiability on the Connecticut home
improvement industry. See note 19 supra, at 647-50.
67. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B. Text at note 27 supra.
68. See note 29 supra.
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protection. The section "assumes that the consumer will read and under-
stand the notice from the assignee, realize that he has a claim or defense
against his seller, and notify the assignee of his claim or defense, all
within three months. These assumptions may be valid as to a knowledge-
able consumer, but certainly not as to a poor, uneducated one."9 This
criticism takes on even greater significance if a state chooses to shorten
the notice period, as Indiana's legislative study committee has recom-
mended doing.70
It is also possible that financers or dealers may employ unscru-
pulous means without violating Alternative B. For example, if the con-
sumer fails to give notice of a claim or defense as required by Alter-
native B, the financer can present an image of being in an even stronger
position than under present law by referring the consumer to a statute
which expressly authorizes waiver of defense clauses in consumer tran-
sactions. The consumer may be defrauded into paying, though he may
have been able to defeat the finance company by a showing of a close
relationship with the dealer or a lack of good faith.7' Furthermore, it is
unlikely that the typical consumer will be aware of section 2.404 of the
UCCC. If he is not, the mere existence of an absolute waiver of defense
clause in his contract, when pointed out by an unscrupulous financer or
dealer, may frighten him into paying.72 Section 2.404 should therefore
be amended to prohibit the insertion of an absolute waiver of defense
clause in a consumer credit contract, and to subject violators to the
liabilities set forth in the UCCC. 3 It is also advisable that a waiver of
defense clause be absolutely unenforceable unless it sets forth con-
spicuously the limitations imposed upon it by Alternative B.
Both alternatives to section 2.404 provide that the consumer may
not sue the assignee affirmatively on a claim which he has against the
69. Jordan and Warren, supra note 38, at 435.
70. See note 29 supra.
71. Jordan and Warren, supra note 38, at 435.
72. Helstad, Consumer Credit Legislation: Limitations on Contractual Terms,
8 B.C. INn. & Com. L. RIv. 519, 531 (1967).
This criticism goes to Alternative A as well, since it does not prohibit the use of
waiver of defense clauses in consumer contracts, but merely renders them unenforceable.
A financer or dealer could still use such a clause "extra-legally" to frighten the
consumer without fear of penalty.
73. UCCC § 5.202 provides that if a creditor violates the provisions of § 2.403,
the consumer is not obligated to pay the credit service charge and may recover from
such creditor or an assignee attempting to enforce payment a penalty not in excess of
three times the amount of the credit service chaxge in addition to reasonable attorney's
fees. UCCC § 6.113(2) provides that the Administrator [to be appointed by the state
to enforce the UCCC]-may bring a civil action against a creditor for willfully violating
the Act, and if the court finds a course of repeated and willful violations it may assess
a penalty not to exceed 5,000 dollars.
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dealer, but rather may only assert these rights as a matter of defense
or set-off against a claim by the assignee."4 In addition, the assignee's
liability may not exceed the balance due on the consumer's obligation to
the assignee.75 Several critics advocate permitting the consumer to
recover from the assignee any claim which he would have against the
seller of the goods, to the full extent of the consumer's loss."6 The
underlying policy is that financers should bear and spread all losses which
a consumer suffers as a result of dealer fraud, breach, or insolvency.
Such a policy is questionable. It places costs on financers which they are
in no position to predict and possibly could not absorb without a severe
tightening of credit or a drastic increase in costs." In the case where
the consumer has paid- most of his installments, he will have also had
the use of the product for a considerable time. If the payments are
viewed as "rental" for the use of the product, the UCCC rule does not
appear to be inequitable.78
CONCLUSION
The typical consumer credit transaction, as a part of which the
consumer executes a promissory note and a conditional sales contract
containing a clause in which he waives all defenses as against assignees,
gives rise to a consumer dilemma if the seller of the merchandise does not
fulfill his part of the bargain. The seller negotiates the promissory note
and assigns the contract to a finance company shortly after the sale
thereby receiving payment and, according to the traditional negotiability
and contract doctrines to which Indiana adheres, divorcing the con-
sumer's payment obligation from the seller's obligations regarding the
purchased merchandise. The consumer is thus deprived of his most
effective weapon for insuring that the seller performs: the ability to
stop payment. In order to receive what he contracted for he must continue
paying the finance company while carrying the additional burden of a
lawsuit against the seller. If the seller is insolvent or disappears, his loss
is even greater. Many states have recognized the consumer's dilemma and
have subjected the finance company to defenses and claims which the
consumer has against his seller. When the finance company's right to
collect from the consumer is thus made contingent upon the seller's
74. UCCC § 2.404. Text at note 27 supra.
75. Id.
76. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT, supra note 56, § 2.405(2). See also Littlefield, supra
note 41, at 288-89, who believes that the assignee's liability should be limited to the
cash price of the goods, or the amount financed, whichever is greater.
77. See Littlefield, supra note 41, at 289.
78. Robertson, spra note 63, at 56-57.
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
performance of the underlying sales contract, the finance company has
an incentive to encourage the seller to perform and to refrain from
financing unreliable sellers. The result is consumer protection in the form
of "policing" of sellers and "spreading" of losses occasioned by sellers.
Regrettably, Indiana has not yet joined this trend toward consumer
protection. However, with the introduction of the UCCC in the 1969
General Assembly and the legislative study committee's recent recom-
mendation of adoption in the 1971 Session, Indiana has an opportunity
to re-examine its position. In spite of a few deficiencies, the enactment of
sections 2.403 and 2.404 of the UCCC would provide Indiana with
long-awaited and necessary reform in the area of preservation of con-
sumer defenses against holders in due course of consumer notes and
assignees of consumer contracts. Section 2.403 compromises consumer
interests by failing to reject entirely the "close connection" and "notice"
concepts thereby preserving elements of holder in due course doctrine
as to consumer notes. The Indiana study committee has further com-
promised consumer interests by amending and recommending Alternative
B of section 2.404. The notice requirement of Alternative B would be
difficult to work with and hardly compares with the consumer protection
offered by the absolute unenforceability of waivers of defenses provided
for in Alternative A. I may be that these compromises will alleviate
some of the fears of UCCC opponents thereby improving its chances of
adoption. Although the proposed UCCC sections 2.403 and 2.404 would
not provide the best possible form of consumer protection, their enact-
ment should be encouraged.
RoRY O'BRYAu
